Elcometer v. TQC-USA, Inc. by United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT





vs. HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
TQC-USA, INC., et al., 
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT TQC-USA, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS [#8],
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE DECLARATION OF JOEL
BIALEK [#18] AND SETTING SCHEDULING DATES
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 18, 2012, Plaintiff, Elcometer, Inc. (“Elcometer”), filed the present trademark
infringement action against Defendants, TQC-USA, Inc. (“TQC”), Paintmeter.com (“Paintmeter”)
and Robert Thoren. Elcometer alleges that Defendants conduct a bait-and-switch scheme using
Plaintiff’s registered trademark, ELCOMETER®, to confuse consumers into purchasing Defendant
TQC’s competing products.
Presently before the Court is TQC’s Motion to Dismiss, filed on November 26, 2012, and
Elcometer’s Motion to Strike the Declaration of Joel Bialek, filed on January 9, 2013.  These
matters are fully briefed and a hearing was held on March 19, 2013.  For the reasons that follow,
the Court grants Elcometer’s Motion to Strike the Declaration of Joel Bialek and denies TQC’s
Motion to Dismiss.  
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II. BACKGROUND
Elcometer has been a leader in the thickness-gauge industry since 1949.  In 1947, it invented
the first non-destructive paint gauges.  Elcometer is responsible for creating novel technology used
in non-destructive testing, including the Elcometer 255, 365, and 456.   Additionally, Elcometer
is the largest manufacturer and distributor of handheld coating thickness gauges and related testing
equipment in the world.  Since at least 1949, Elcometer has continuously used the trademark
ELCOMETER®  and is the owner of U.S. Trademark Registration No. 0852696 for the mark which
is for “thickness gauges for measuring and checking surface coatings.”  Elcometer claims to have
invested substantial time, effort and money in the promotion of its mark, as well as established
goodwill in connection with the mark.  Elcometer’s mark is famous and widely known as being
associated with Elcometer and distinguishes Elcometer products from other products.   Further,
Elcometer’s products are available directly from Elcometer or through Elcometer’s authorized
distributors.  
DeFelsko Corporation (“DeFelsko”) is a direct competitor of Elcometer in the industry for
thickness gauges used in measuring surface coatings on automobiles and other surfaces.  TQC is
an authorized distributor of DeFelsko products.  TQC’s founder, Joel Bialek, is a former Elcometer
employee and currently is employed with DeFelsko.  Defendants Paintmeter and Thoren, also a
former Elcometer employee, are authorized dealers and distributors for TQC.   Defendants Thoren
and Paintmeter work hand-in-hand with TQC to promote TQC and DeFelsko.  
Defendants own and operate a website at www.paintmeter.com.  Defendants have purchased
the ELCOMETER® mark as a Google® adword.  As a result, a user that enters the search term
Elcometer into the Google® search engine will see the following as the first sponsored link, which
takes the user directly to the Paintmeter website:
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Elcometer Meters & Rentals * Paintmeter.com
www.paintmeter.com/
Call 18009742492 We Sell PaintMeters & Rent Coating Inspection Equipment 
Thus, customers and potential customers searching for Elcometer are directed to the Paintmeter
website.  Upon arriving at the Paintmeter website, a customer or potential customer will see a site
that appears to be associated with or sponsored by Elcometer.  Therefore, the Paintmeter website
creates the false impression that Paintmeter is an authorized distributor of Elcometer products. 
Additionally, when potential customers call the numbers listed on the Paintmeter website, Thoren
or other Paintmeter employees, falsely represent that they are affiliated with Elcometer.  They also
make false and disparaging statements about Elcometer products such as misrepresentations about
the quality, reliability, and price of Elcometer’s products, as well as Elcometer’s reputation for
truthfulness and fair dealing.  Elcometer has contacted Thoren and asked that he cease using
Elcometer’s trademark and remove references to Elcometer’s products from his website.  He has
refused. 
Elcometer’s Complaint alleges the following claims: Federal trademark infringement in
violation of the Lanham Act, Count I; False advertising/unfair competition in violation of the
Lanham Act, Count II; Common law trademark infringement and unfair competition, Count III;
Contributory trademark infringement, Count IV; Product disparagement, Count V; Violation of the
Michigan Consumer Protection Act, Count VI; Tortious interference with existing and prospective
business relations, Count VII; and an accounting, Count VIII.  
III. LAW & ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(b)(6) allows the court to make an assessment as to
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whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).  “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).  Even though the complaint
need not contain “detailed” factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the
complaint are true.”  Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555).  
The court must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, accept the allegations of the
complaint as true, and determine whether plaintiff’s factual allegations present plausible claims. 
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s pleading for relief must provide “more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.”  Id.  (citations and quotations omitted).  “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).   “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid 
of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id.  “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.  The plausibility
standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Id. 
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not ‘show[n]’– ‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. at 1950.  
The district court generally reviews only the allegations set forth in the complaint in
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determining on whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, however “matters of public
record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint, also
may be taken into account. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F. 3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001). 
Documents attached to a defendant’s “motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they
are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her claim.” Id.  
B. TQC’s Motion to Dismiss and Elcometer’s Motion to Strike Declaration of Joel 
Bialek  
The gist of TQC’s Motion to Dismiss is that Elcometer impermissibly lumps TQC together
with Defendants Thoren and Paintmeter, as well as fails to establish an agency relationship between
these defendants and Elcometer.  Notably, TQC does not otherwise attack the substance of
Plaintiff’s federal and state trademark infringement claims under the Lanham and Michigan
Consumer Protection Acts.  
Under Michigan agency law, “a corporation may be held liable for the authorized acts of
another corporation acting as its agent.”  Pfaffenberger v. Pavilion Restaurant Co., 352 Mich. 1,
6; 88 N.W.2d 488 (1958).  Here, Elcometer has sufficiently alleged an agency relationship.  See
Compl., ¶¶ 8, 10.  Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Defendants TQC, Paintmeter and Thoren
have each acted as an agent for the other and the acts complained of in the Complaint were
committed within the scope of such agency.  In fact, TQC acknowledges in its Response that
Paintmeter acts as a dealer for TQC and that TQC warehouses numerous rental units for Paintmeter
and Thoren.  Further, TQC inexplicably argues that if any agency relationship exists, it is limited
to only the distribution of thickness gauges.  On this argument alone, TQC’s Motion to Dismiss
fails since the allegations in the Complaint relate to, among other things, the distribution of
thickness gauges.  Lastly, Elcometer alleges that TQC has knowledge of Paintmeter’s and Thoren’s
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infringement by virtue of Bialek’s prior employment with Elcometer, as well as alleges that TQC
continues to supply it competing products to Paintmeter and Thoren, thereby encouraging and
facilitating the infringement.  Thus, Elcometer has sufficiently alleged an agency relationship
rendering TQC liable for infringement.  
TQC’s attempt to establish that no agency relationship exists between TQC, Paintmeter and
Thoren by attaching Joel Bialek’s declaration to its Reply Brief cannot save its ill premised Motion
to Dismiss.  As an initial matter, it is improper for the Court to rely on the declaration at this stage
in the proceedings as a district court generally reviews only the allegations set forth in the
complaint in determining whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  See Weiner v. Klais
& Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Matters outside the pleadings are not to be considered
by a court in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”)  However, “matters of public record, orders,
items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint, also may be taken
into account. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F. 3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001).  Documents attached
to a defendant’s “motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in
the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her claim.” Id.  Additionally, even if it were appropriate
for this Court to consider Mr. Bialek’s declaration under Rule 12(b)(6), its consideration would
nonetheless be inappropriate because TQC included it in its Reply brief, rather than in its Motion
to Dismiss.  Thus, Elcometer was prevented an opportunity to respond to this evidence. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Elcometer’s Motion to Strike the Declaration of Joel Bialek and
will not consider the declaration in resolving TQC’s Motion to Dismiss.  
Furthermore, Elcometer has sufficiently stated federal and state common law trademark
infringement claims.  The Lanham Act provides that any person or entity who “uses in commerce”
a registered trademark “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
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of any good or services” where the “use is likely to cause confusion, . . . . shall be liable in a civil
action” brought by the trademark owner.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).  To state a plausible claim under
the Lanham Act, Elcometer “must allege facts establishing that: (1) it owns the registered
trademark; (2) the defendant used the mark in commerce; and (3) the use was likely to cause
confusion.”  Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2009).  Here, Elcometer alleges
that it has continuously used the trademark ELCOMETER®  and is the owner of U.S. Trademark
Registration No. 0852696 for the ELCOMETER® mark.  Further, Elcometer alleges that
Defendants use the ELCOMETER® mark as a Google® adword so that consumers and potential
consumers are directed to the Paintmeter website when conducting a search using the search term,
“Elcometer.”  When consumers arrive at the Paintmeter website, they are deceived into believing
they are on a website of an authorized dealer or seller of ELCOMETER® products.  
Contrary to TQC’s assertions, “liability for trademark infringement can extend beyond those
who actually mislabel goods with the mark of another.”  Johnson v. Jones, 885 F. Supp. 1008, 1016
(E.D. Mich. 1995).  The United Supreme Court has held that:
Even if a manufacturer does not directly control others in the chain of distribution,
it can be held responsible for their infringing activities under certain circumstances. 
Thus, if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as result of the deceit. 
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).  The Complaint
makes precisely these allegations. Compl., ¶¶ 66-72. The Court further notes that at the hearing on
this matter, Elcometer produced evidence, dated March 19, 2013, suggesting that TQC continues
to supply its products using Paintmeter and Thoren, despite TQC’s knowledge, both before and
after the filing of the instant action, of Paintmeter’s infringement of Elcometer’s mark.
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Additionally, to state a claim for false advertising and/or unfair competition under the
Lanham Act, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) Defendants made false or misleading representations
of the nature, characteristics, or qualities of plaintiffs’ services; (2) that defendants used the false
or misleading representations “in commerce,” or in connection with any services; (3) that
defendants made the false or misleading representations in the context of commercial advertising
or commercial promotion; and (4) that defendants’ actions made plaintiffs believe that they were
likely to suffer damages by such false or misleading factual representations.  National Artists Mgmt
Co., Inc. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
It is unclear why TQC argues that Plaintiff’s claims of false advertising and unfair
competition under the Lanham Act are subject to heightened pleading requirements similar to Rule
9(b)’s heightened pleading standards.  TQC fails to provide the Court with any controlling authority
from this Circuit applying the particularity standards of Rule 9(b) to allegations of false advertising
or unfair competition.  This is because this is not the law.  This Court has previously recognized
that, “Rule [9(b)] provides that fraud claims must be pleaded with particularity, but it makes no
mention of false advertising claims.”  Dow Corning Corp. v. Jie Xiao, No. 11-10008, 2011 WL
2015517, at *9 n.2 (E.D. Mich. May 20, 2011 (noting that defendants failed to identify a Sixth
Circuit case requiring a heightened pleading standard for such claims).  Elcometer’s allegations
sufficiently plead a false advertising/unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act.  Elcometer
claims that Paintmeter, through Thoren or his employees, makes disparaging remarks about the
quality, reliability, and price of Elcometer’s products in order to induce consumers into purchasing
the products of Elcometer’s competitor, TQC. 
Lastly, “the MCPA prohibits ‘unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts or
practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Van Dyke Liquor Mkt.,
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Inc., 471 Mich. F.Supp. 2d 822 (E.D. Mich. 2007)(citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.903(1)).  The
Lanham Act and Michigan state law claims for unfair competition are both governed by the same
standards.  Id. at 832. Thus, since Elcometer has stated plausible federal trademark infringement
claims, its state trademark infringement claims likewise withstand Rule 12(b)(6) attack. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that TQC’s Motion to Dismiss
[#8] is DENIED.  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Declaration of Joel Bialek
[#18] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following dates shall govern in this matter:
Witness Lists Filed By: August 26, 2013 
Discovery Cutoff: October 7, 2013 
Dispositive Motion Cutoff: November 4, 2013 
Case Evaluation:1 October of 2013 
Settlement Conference before Magistrate
Judge Paul J. Komives:
January of 2014 
Motions in Limine due: January 6, 2014 
Final Pretrial Order due: February 4, 2014 
Final Pretrial Conference: February 11, 2014 at 2:00 p.m. 
Trial Date: February 25, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. 
Jury Demand 
1  The parties may submit the case to facilitation in lieu of case evaluation.  A proposed stipulated
order referring the case to facilitation shall be submitted to the Court via the utilities function on
CM/ECF no later than August 26, 2013.  The proposed order must identify the facilitator and the date
set for facilitation.  Facilitation must occur no later than October 31, 2013.   
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 /s/Gershwin A Drain                                       
                                    GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 9, 2013
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served on the attorneys of record on April 9, 2013, by electronic and/or
ordinary mail.
/s/ Tanya Bankston                         
Deputy Clerk
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